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With industrial strategy once again firmly ‘back on the agenda’ of policy makers in Western 
economies, it is important to pause and ask the most basic question: what is industrial policy for? 
The answer that springs forth in this current phase of interest is that the goal of industrial policy is to 
lift economic performance as measured by quantifiable growth indicators, such as labour 
productivity, employment, and shares in trade. In Western Europe at least, sustainability is now 
another prominent objective, albeit one promoted as the companion of growth rather than its 
potentially stringent challenger. While there is much in these ambitions and challenges for social 
scientists to contend with, an important dimension to past industrial policy debates has so far 
received an inadequate voice in the present one. The aim of this paper is to address the emerging 
imbalance by urging social scientists to think more broadly about their role than they are currently 
being invited to do in the terms of reference being set out by governments looking to industrial 
policy as a means of promoting economic growth. In asking what industrial policy is for, thought 
should also be given as to whether enhancing participation by populations in democratic decision 
making, through a more distributed set of decision rights, is a desirable goal of policy. 
 
The other elements in industrial policy may well then differ depending on which voices are counted 
as relevant in deciding aims. Hence the distribution of decision rights – which people count – is at 
least as much about what these other goals for policy are as about how, where and when they are 
pursued. This paper is therefore not concerned with laying down a normative approach towards 
better delivery of prior objectives, but rather with the social processes of inclusion or exclusion 
which decide what these objectives are. Similarly, it is not proposed that thinking about social 
participation in policy design offers a magic formula that will banish all tensions from economy and 
society. To give one important example, it is clearly not the case that evolving a more broadly 
distributed set of decision rights for deciding policy can be relied upon to solve tensions between 
(say) growth and sustainability. What is proposed rather is that if hard choices are to be made, then 
in deciding what these choices are, and how they should be decided, inclusive processes of decision 
making may be pertinent to questions of social equity and social stability. 
 
The approach taken in this paper is twofold. To begin with, it explores the two most recent sea 
changes in the industrial policy landscape of the European Union (EU), looked at from the vantage 
point of popular participation in questions relating to industry. The first of these concerns 
developments that coalesced throughout the 1990s in the course of economic integration. These 
 3 
 
were marked by a predilection for generally defined policy intended for industry ‘as a whole’, and as 
such avowedly non-discriminatory in approach towards different sectors and firms. It is argued that 
this first development, homocentric with what some identify as neoliberalism, was consistent with 
an essentially ademocratic economic philosophy which by construction left no public space for 
debates around the width or narrowness of popular participation in economic decisions. The second, 
gathering momentum since the fallouts of the financial crisis of 2008, has seen the re-assertion of 
industrial policy as a means of discriminating between sectors and firms. However, rather than 
heralding an immediate re-awakening of public policy debate on questions of participation and 
democracy, this new phase is more easily criticised for its undemocratic qualities. It is suggested that 
understanding these developments, and their cross-connections, is an essential part of 
understanding the terrain upon which Europe’s industrial policy debates now stand. 
 
Since it would be neither possible nor anything other than a presumption to attempt to set out the 
details of ‘how’ democratisation should be done, the next plank in this paper is to propose that 
exploring metaphors around place offers one way of evolving shared or common frames of 
reference that can facilitate progress in this area. Although there have been major past traditions of 
international collaboration and debate around questions of social participation and inclusion in 
industrial policy formulation in Europe, it is also true that these have struggled with differences in 
national institutions and cultural expectations. It is the contention of this paper that a dialogue 
around an extended notion of place offers at the least the potential for the development of a new 
notation or vocabulary to help circumvent these. Similarly, it offers the potential for encompassing 
in a coherent way a wider range of human interests and constituents than have traditionally been 
within the purview of industrial policy, which has traditionally skewed towards particular 
manufacturing interests and (more latterly) the bigger cities. 
 
Constraints of space limit the discussion in this paper to (some) Western European experience, 
focusing on the most relevant sea changes in the contours of EU-wide policy. The implications for 
the particular trajectories of national cases are principally illustrated for the mirroring example of 
Britain, but with discussion also of the pressures on, and industrial policy responses of, France, 
Germany, and Italy. That there really is a need for urgency in extending the exploration of 
democracy and place into the industrial policy arena can be understood by reference to recent 
contributions on the conjunctures of globalisation and ensuing economic, political, social, cultural 
and environmental problems and instabilities (Martin et al 2018), and the rise of populism (see, for 
example, Rodriguez-Pose 2018). The seemingly spontaneous flaring up of the Gilets Jaunes 
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movement in France and President Macron’s subsequent efforts to quell these protests by means of 
a Grande Debate – attempting a controlled form of direct policy consultation – is another case in 
point. 
 
Sea changes in the EU industrial policy climate 
It is useful to begin with changes in the official policy stance of the EU considered purely on its own 
terms. The particular national case of Britain is also introduced in this section, because in many 
respects it is an exemplary one from the viewpoint of mirrored national developments. Of prime 
importance at both levels is the distinction between a policy approach which formally eschews 
discrimination between sectors or firms, and one which accepts discrimination. The section which 
follows this one will next consider the implications of these changes for the width or narrowness of 
social participation in processes of policy selection and design. 
 
To horizontalism and beyond: the view from Brussels 
By recent convention the industrial policy literature refers to a horizontal policy framework when 
denoting measures intended to apply across all or many business sectors. Practically by definition, 
an avowedly horizontal industrial policy is also a non-discriminatory one. The first ‘explicit 
recognition’ of an agreed industrial policy position by the European Commission (EC) in fact came as 
late as 1990 and favoured horizontal policy design, described in terms of establishing ‘favourable 
framework conditions’ rather than ‘sector specific approaches’ (Lawton 1999: 12). By this means, a 
clear signal was given to member states to eschew efforts to shape the structure of their national 
economies by means of discriminatory policies favouring some industries over others. Seen against 
the backdrop of past multiple histories of sectoral intervention in Western Europe, this move both 
reflected and heralded the first of the two sea-changes alluded to in the introduction. 
 
A subsequent competitiveness White Paper published by the Commission (CEC 1994) built on this to 
package horizontalism as the new European industrial policy approach. Contrary to some 
interpretations, this is best understood as a desire to further promote non-discriminatory policy 
stances amongst EU member states towards firms operating inside the single market, while 
restraining independent industrial ambitions that could interfere with the harmonisation of business 
rules and progress towards European economic integration.[1] The new policy zeitgeist was 
anticipated by Porter (1990) thus: ‘policy must shift to much more indirect forms of government 
assistance designed to support efforts by any industry to upgrade its demand conditions, human 
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resources and scientific expertise … [to] the development of particular skills or technologies that are 
important to upgrading in a substantial number of industries’ (ibid: 675; original emphasis).  
 
However, since the financial crisis of 2008 the Commission’s policy positioning has partially shifted to 
accommodate more specifically tailored policies to support sector goals. In this respect, Aiginger 
(2015) identifies three main stages in its policy thinking over the past three decades, beginning with 
the initial thrust just described towards horizontalist policy architectures (ibid: 370-372). More 
recently, a view has been taken that economies with a stronger pre-2008 manufacturing and trade 
performance have fared better since. For this reason, there has been a new concern for a more 
‘integrated’ industrial policy, one nesting additional sector-targeting measures within a still broadly 
horizontal framework to support areas of European competitive strength: for example, in 
automotive, aerospace, aeronautics, and engineering more generally, together with chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (ibid: 376-378). Finally, concerns about the status and location of energy-intensive 
industries, and pressures for ‘greening’, have encouraged revisions in policy framing (ibid). 
 
In this way, sector-targeting has moved back up the EC prospectus. One immediate caveat that 
should be observed is that, as Cowling et al (1999: 19) note, the distinction between horizontal and 
sector-targeting approaches to industrial policy may well blur at the point of practical application. 
Policies initially conceived of in highly generic terms often acquire sector-specific content when 
implemented: for example, general skills or technology programmes, which perforce then become 
tailored to specific sector needs. Even before the crisis there was a growing recognition on the 
Commission’s part that horizontalism still required adjustments to accommodate sector-level 
differences. Indeed, Aiginger and Sieber (2006: 579-582) identified a prospective shift into a ‘matrix’ 
formulation with horizontal and vertical (sectoral) elements. To this extent, the practical effect of 
the 2008 crisis, together with by now mounting sustainability concerns, may have been to add 
greater substance as well as impetus to a policy reformulation that was being considered anyway, 
vis-à-vis targeted sector-support. Another caveat is that there is a pragmatic case to be made that 
EU member states had in any case continued in varying degrees to practice forms of policy favouring 
particular sectors and firms. Examples of this are considered subsequently.  
 
Nonetheless, the official shift away from a preferred strict horizontalism in questions of industrial 
policy, towards an openly conceded role for sector-targeting policies, represents a real and 
important change in the climate for industrial policy in the EU. Unlike a horizontal policy stance, 
sector-targeting implies by definition an intendedly discriminatory approach. While still subject to 
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the conditionality that those policies intended to promote specific industries or sectors should not 
become a mere disguise for nationalism and the end of the single market project, this subsequent 
move reflects and heralds the second of the two sea changes in industrial policy. 
 
The policy apprehension of space 
What is of particular and related interest is that horizontalism invoked a conceptual apparatus which 
weakened, by neglect, sensitivity to problems of location. An obvious corollary of abstracting from 
sector specificities when designing policy is that no regard is given to how the firms making up these 
sectors distribute differently in space. In fact, a strictly horizontal conception of industrial policy, 
applied to any territorial space, is an aspatial construct insofar as this territory is concerned, because 
the abstractions made from specific sector features include disregard for where the firms comprising 
them locate, in terms of their investments and employment. Adhered to in a serious manner, 
locational factors can only emerge on the same footing as other ‘adjustments’ to tailor intendedly 
generic policies to unavoidably specific industry or sector features. By extension, how and where 
human populations locate is not a main industrial policy concern. 
 
In this respect, another significant feature has been the emergence of placed-based development 
strategies in the context of EU-level discussions of responses to the 2008 crisis. In a report requested 
by the then European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Barca (2009) proposed an increase in the 
Community budget for place-based policy responses to tackle ‘underutilisation of potential’ and 
‘social exclusion’ through ‘external intervention and multilevel governance’, with due regard to the 
significance of local conditions and knowledge in the places chosen (ibid: vii).  A heavy emphasis was 
placed on sponsoring business productivity and innovation, by providing ‘integrated bundles of 
public goods and services’ to spur ‘institutional change’ (ibid: xi). Another point made very clearly in 
this document was the task of re-legitimising the EU: ‘Tackling the inefficiency and exclusion traps 
that arise in Europe is a task for the EU because if it is not successfully performed the EU is blamed … 
solidarity at the Union level can be a strong cement’ (ibid: xii). But while the report argued 
accordingly for a continuing ‘framework role’ for the EU, it also made clear that specific 
responsibilities as well as selection of cases should devolve down to regions where jurisdictional 
roles and responsibilities permit, as well as to national state level (ibid). The softening of pressure on 
EU member states not to use the levers of the state to discriminate in favour of selected sectors was 





Policy evolutions in Britain: mirrored developments 
As is well known, successive governments led by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s rejected any role 
for government as an organiser or manager of industry. After frequent recourse to ad hoc policy 
lurches, made on a case by case basis, and amidst a gradually accelerating divestment of state 
holdings in industry as part of a wider privatisation process, a more settled approach emerged under 
successor governments in the 1990s.[2] In broad conformity with the trend of EC policy direction, a 
more or less consistently articulated and expressly horizontalist approach to policy fell into place. 
This gave prominence to the free play of ‘competitive’ market forces, not least to encourage inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) for Britain’s internationalised economy. It culminated in the policy 
tack of the first New Labour governments, led by Tony Blair from 1997. It is in this period that the 
horizontal policy architecture for Britain fell most clearly into place.  
 
Drawing on Coates (2005) survey, figure 1 summarises this policy structure, and its intended 
outcome for international business investment. Assisted entry, underwritten by low exit costs, 
combined with weak collective rights for labour, light touch market regulation, and low social 
contributions were key elements. These were supported by the promise of supporting social and 
commercial infrastructures and (before 2008) a stable macroeconomic environment governed by 
transparent fiscal and monetary policy rules. The latter was focused on debt-income ratios and a 
commitment to borrow only to invest over the cycle, together with rules-based interest rate setting 
to target inflation based on its distance from a two percent target rate. Support was promised too 
for technologies in generally beneficial areas like communications and IT. Coates also highlights the 
prominence New Labour gave to workforce ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ (ibid: 96). Skills and education 
programmes, including laudatory efforts on adult literacy and life-long learning schemes, targeted 
quality. Meanwhile, reforms on welfare, a new minimum wage plus (subsequently rescinded) tax 
credits for low earners, and investments in childcare, together with pressures to work on the long-
term unemployed and single parents, helped secure quantity. From 2004, the accession of Poland 
and other East European countries to the EU became important to British policy on both fronts. 
   
insert figure one here 
 
What is of interest for present purposes is not so much the particular details of these elements in 
policy, as to how the policy architecture as a whole was now being conceived: horizontalist in 
inspiration, at least in the first instance, while conceding a policy role for the state. The approach 
was likewise notable for the subordinated position awarded Britain’s sub-regions. The Thatcher era 
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had previously seen government interest wither, and regional policy instruments dismantled. When 
Britain matched the European Commission by publishing its own competitiveness White Paper (HMG 
1994), beyond praise for London’s financial services sector and a comment on urban renewal, its 
regional analysis was nugatory. There was ‘virtually no analysis of regional divergence and 
competitiveness and the constraint that regional inequality places on overall income levels and 
growth’ (Oughton 2003: 18). New Labour did establish eight Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
in 1998 with a remit to promote regional development in England (Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland being treated for regional development purposes as separate territories with their own 
governance), in co-operation with local government, business, and other stake-holding parties. 
However, in keeping with the dominant policy thrust these did not so much empower regions as 
facilitate delivery of external investment – not least through inward FDI – in traded services and 
manufacture.[3]  
 
Although in this respect no two member states have been identical, the purpose of this example is to 
illustrate how the changing contours of EU-wide policy can be seen mirrored in developments on a 
national plane, taking Britain as an exemplary case in point.  After the financial crisis of 2008 
eviscerated the macroeconomic model this mirroring continued, with the same movement towards 
explicit sectoral policies overlaid with new environmental imperatives. Indeed, the most immediate 
response was a low carbon industrial strategy (HMG 2009), which identified industrial policy with 
commercial exploitation of low carbon technologies. This simultaneously highlighted the importance 
of regional factors by identifying Low Carbon Economic Areas (LCEAs) as focal locations for sectoral 
policy support: these included marine technology in the South-West of England, ultra-low carbon 
vehicles in the North-East and advanced automotive engineering in the Midlands, and construction 
in the Greater Manchester area. Another significant and eponymously subtitled policy document, 
‘Industrial Strategy: UK Sector Analysis’ (HMG 2012), confirmed aerospace, automotive, and 
pharmaceuticals as strategic national sectors. The combined weight of relative manufacturing 
collapse (absolute manufacturing output being less in 2009 than when Britain joined what is now the 
EU in 1973: see Griffiths and Wall 2012: 4), together with growing recognition of environmental 
pressures on energy intensive industries (EIIs) [4], underpinned British recognition of an express case 
for selected sector targeting and tailored policy support. 
 
However, signalling on regional and local policy has been more mixed. The first post-New Labour 
government, a Conservative-dominated coalition taking office in 2010, promptly replaced the RDAs 
established by Labour with a larger number of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), whose remit was 
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(and is) to bring local government, business, and other parties together on a more localised plane. 
But lacking scale, resources and experience, concern was expressed that this in fact amounted to de-
facto re-centralisation, losing regional agencies that could have been redeployed to mediate 
between national government and genuinely localised activities. Although using the language of 
place-based approaches the coalition’s approach to ‘localism’ was thus criticised for failing to take 
‘place’ seriously enough (Hildreth and Bailey, 2013). Consistent with this, when the so-called 
Heseltine Report (2012), commissioned by then Prime Minister David Cameron, called for a £49bn 
transfer via a new ‘Single Local Growth Fund’, as part of a programme of devolved growth 
management, the Treasury massively downscaled the sum.  
 
The same coalition government subsequently announced a City Deal initiative. Ostensibly based on a 
critique of New Labour ‘top down’ and ‘command state’ centralism, and intended to devolve 
‘powers, responsibilities and resources’ in relation to urban infrastructures, this initiative was 
similarly launched in a national political and economic context dominated by the fiscal consolidation 
priorities of central government (O’Brien and Pike 2018: 12). Critics since have argued that what 
happened in practice was that ‘national government actors’ used a protracted process of 
negotiations to ‘compel local actors’, ‘shaping and channelling their behaviours in centrally 
orchestrated directions’ (ibid: 17), subverting a place-based approach. While a place-based approach 
to cities and regions is promised in the most recent major industrial policy launch – ‘Industrial 
Strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future’ (HMG 2017) – quite how far this represents a 
substantive break from the past is similarly open to question: see RSA (2017), for example.  
 
Accounting for a dearth of democracy 
Turning to how these changes relate to the key question of social participation in policy, the 
chronological progression from a generic and horizontal policy stance towards industry ‘as a whole’, 
to the subsequent re-emergence of more specifically targeted forms of intervention is integral to 
understanding the present situation. We now propose that pressures on EU member state to 
develop the principle of policy non-discrimination between sectors and firms conduced to the 
formation of an essentially ademocratic industrial policy culture. Further to this, we argue that the 
ademocratic policy culture thus fostered helps explain why the re-emergence of more targeted 
forms of intervention has not been matched by sensitivities to inclusive policy making. In the 
particular case of Britain, so far considered as a mirroring illustration, this must also be understood 
in the context of a national policy culture which has in any case been hierarchical and London-




Horizontalism and ademocratic policy cultures 
The structural limits placed on social participation in industrial policy by a thoroughgoing adherence 
to horizontalism in policy design are almost self-evident. This is because two very pressing issues for 
the populations affected by industrial policy are abstracted from. The first is where people live; it has 
already been pointed out that abstracting from what makes industries specific, at the point where 
policies for business are (generically and aspatially) conceived, dulls sensitivities to location. The 
second is what people work at; by extension, there is no interest in the working experience of 
people, because much of the experience of work, and what people know as a result, is to a great 
extent rooted in the specific character and locales of those same industries. Any conception of social 
participation in an approach to industrial policy which by construction allows no particular regard for 
where people live and what they work at must be a tepid one. 
 
The same problem could be broached by considering the critique of neoliberalism. This, of course, is 
a phrase which fails to adhere to any single definition or consistent usage. However, in a careful 
survey of the discourse, Gamble (2009) distinguishes three broad strands. In addition to ‘market 
fundamentalist’ and ‘market anarchy’ strands, in which the state either works to simply eliminate 
obstacles to market forces or is invited inter alia to vacate the scene altogether, there is also social 
market neoliberalism. In this case, markets are regarded as broadly efficient and awarded something 
like primacy in matters of economic organisation (assuming a private ownership economy which is 
marked by competition between profit seeking firms). But an important role is also given to state or 
para-state institutions in areas like skills (human capital), infrastructures (social capital), social 
welfare (limited redistribution) and the environment (ibid: 70-72). Gamble finds, as an empirical 
point, that the policy stances most frequently described by critics as ‘neoliberal’ conform in practice 
to a variant of the last strand; in other words, to social market neoliberalism. An important element 
in the critique of this strand of neoliberalism is what Gamble describes as a propensity towards 
‘depoliticization’ of the economy. In democracies, this means distancing economic decisions from 
electorates by transferring control to unelected officials, cases in point being independence for 
central banks like the ECB or (since 1997) the Bank of England in Britain (ibid: 88). 
 
However, from the viewpoint of ‘distancing’ electorates from economic decisions, the industrial 
policy directives of the European Commission from 1990 and before 2008, favouring ‘framework 
conditions’ for business over sectoral interventions, could similarly be construed as depoliticizing 
because they remove the most obvious reason for public consultation. The question, of which 
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industries to support, as well as why and how they should be supported, simply disappears. Lacking 
any formal principles of policy selection beyond the most generic, social inclusion in policy formation 
retain little space for impressing itself upon policy makers. Differently put, where the needs of 
industry are conceived in the first instance in highly generic terms, the implied discounting by policy 
makers of popular experience based on location and work is consistent with a cultural shift towards 
a less democratic conception of policy, distancing policy makers from a sense of the value of people 
having a say in the details of policies which affect them.  
 
Consider the illustrative case of pre-2008 Britain. Key types of policy which Gamble describes as 
most characteristic of social market neoliberalism, like state support for social investment 
programmes in human capital and infrastructures, appear prominently in the policy array displayed 
in figure 1. A non-discriminatory stance towards different sectors and firms is both accompanied and 
complemented by a non-discretionary stance towards rules for macro-economic management, 
jointly vitiating any role for public consultation or social inclusion in determining policy. Each has the 
consequence of distancing the reasons for policy from social participation in deciding policy. In 
considering this, the key issue is the overall style of policy, and what this style entails. Because 
markets are treated as essentially sufficient governance mechanisms for economic decisions once 
appropriately supported, strict horizontalism and social market neoliberalism can be represented – 
as in figure 2 – as substantially homologous entities when applied to industrial policy.  
  
insert figure 2 around here 
 
From ademocratic to undemocratic 
However, while processes leading to the break-up of this kind of unified vision for economic and 
industrial policy are now well underway, it is not axiomatic that the re-emergence of more 
discriminatory policy stances will be accompanied by more democratic stances.  Whether in the 
form of a renewed interest in sectoral industrial policy, or in policy interventions at the level of cities 
or regions, the potential which exists for redressing a previous closing down of the scope for popular 
participation in industrial policy formation may not be realised in practice. Indeed, it would not be at 
all surprising if an ademocratic policy culture segued into an undemocratic one. 
 
Consider once more the case of Britain, this time from 2008. Beginning with the switch-back to 
sector targeting, one obvious problem is the criteria by which targeted industries are selected.  
Figure 3 presents the industry ranking selected in HMG (2012), the eponymous sector strategy 
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document previously described for Britain; as previously noted, aerospace, automotive and 
pharmaceuticals emerged in pole position as strategic sectors. The document itself justified these 
selections partly on the basis of claimed returns to ‘the economy’ for state support for R&D, as well 
as an assessment of export potentials in a growing world economy. However, there was no public 
debate either on which industries should be selected, or on their conditions of support. For example, 
the population at large might well agree that pharmaceuticals, which along with bio-tech and med-
tech accounts for the important life sciences sector, should be supported by industrial policy; but an 
open and inclusive debate might also insist on other sector-specific priorities, like the pricing of 
pharmaceutical products or returns – pace Mazzucato (2015) – on public moneys thus invested. 
 
Moreover, even a little familiarity with the practices of the British state is sufficient to suggest that 
these are examples par excellence of sectors that had in any case continued to enjoy privileges: via 
defence budgets and tacit R&D support, for aerospace; via NHS budgets and tacit R&D support, for 
pharmaceuticals; via a tax system that has, over a period of decades, swelled the business fleet 
subsector, to support new car registrations; etc. It was noted in the previous section that despite the 
official European policy shift towards horizontalism in the 1990s, abjuring targeted support for 
favoured sectors, degrees of national sectoral favouritism certainly persisted. However, de facto 
continuities in state-business relations for privileged sectors, through a period in which such 
relations were officially denied, does not alter the basic argument. It would merely mean that the 
overlay of a horizontalist policy perspective, which by construction distances the populations 
impacted by policy from participating in deciding policy, concealed subterranean privileges. An 
ademocratic overlay which masks other practices still keeps these practices from open debate. One 
outcome is that other industries, like food-processing (mid-way in figure 3), or agriculture (bottom) 
have been implicitly deselected as strategic for industrial policy, without any public discussion of a 
range of important social issues ranging from food-chains to bio-ethics to the environment. 
 
insert figure 3 around here 
 
A similar deficit of democracy has already been noted in Britain’s City Deal initiatives, with central 
government fiscal priorities over-riding local priorities despite ostensible devolution of powers, and 
similarly in the unwillingness of the national Treasury to more generously fund local structures. 
Although the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act of 2016 introduced directly elected 
mayors alongside devolved powers relating to areas like transport, housing, planning and policing, 
the ‘deals’ can still be criticised as local assemblages of choices from a Treasury-approved menu, 
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with little real impetus towards democratic renewal, while the decision on where to institute the 
new role of metro-mayor has itself been centralised (Tomaney 2016). A more prominent role for 
business elites, than for ordinary citizens, has been observed. However, if engagement by state 
policy makers that fails to go beyond commercially privileged parties is hardly evidence of a 
significant widening of social participation in policy decisions, the crumbling of what at least was the 
façade of neoliberalism still carries within it the potential for more radical changes.  
 
Social dialogue through an extended notion of place 
To this point the analysis is concerned with setting out the changing terrain upon which industrial 
policy debate in Western Europe now stands, as this applies to the important social question of how 
the content of industrial policy is decided. It is argued that an essentially ademocratic policy 
approach, perhaps concealing other forms of ongoing connectedness between states and industries, 
is at risk of transforming into a de facto system of privileges, without any accompanying and 
inclusive processes of public policy debate. This has been illustrated so far for the particular instance 
of Britain, chosen as a mirroring case. In this section, the discussion is extended to Western Europe’s 
other large economies, all founding members of the EU. It is neither intended nor possible to 
consider these cases in depth. But even a brief consideration, taken in the round, is relevant to 
spurring interest in questions relating to participative industrial policy. 
 
As a preliminary to this it must be acknowledged that there have been past difficulties in developing 
a comparative dialogue on this complex question. Even where there are important shared 
experiences, there is still the reality of nationally-specific cultural expectations and institutions. 
However, one way of broaching this is to think more broadly about the conceptualisation of ‘place’, 
which has re-emerged as a potent way of connecting policy to regional concerns. The original spur to 
the latest wave of interest in place has already been described. But it is perhaps relevant to 
emphasise that the initial impetus provided by Barca (2009) had as its intended domain the 
relevance of place-based policy to all parts of the EU.  In addition to familiar problems like balancing 
regional strengths with strategies for diversification, and engaging local groups with external 
agencies (see, for example, McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015; Bailey et al 2015), place-based 
perspectives also typically emphasise the multiplicity of actors to be engaged. These could include: 
local or regional government bodies, local business networks, local universities and research 
institutions, and so forth. They frequently invoke ‘bottom up’ participation. As a framing device, 
‘place’ thus lends itself naturally to the language of inclusivity. Experienced commentators on 
policies for cities and regions have also found within it the scope for a binding theme, capable of 
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integrating the disparate elements which are relevant to industrial policy. For example, and 
notwithstanding that experiments with devolved policy making in Britain to date can be criticised for 
falling well-short of genuinely place-based initiatives, Martin et al (2017) have argued that Britain’s 
industrial strategy should adopt ‘place’ as its ‘overarching and integrating theme’, rather than its 
final pillar (ibid: 2). This is in line with other writers. That there is otherwise a ‘missing space’, a 
phrase deployed by Hildreth and Bailey (2014) when calling for a more genuinely innovative 
approach with mediating tiers to bring ‘place’ and ‘sectors’ together, is suggestive. 
 
In considering this, an observation that can be added is that place, viewed as a metaphor, also 
invites a wider spatial sensitivity than cities and regions alone. In the policy literature aiming at cities 
or regions, place focuses on spatial contiguity of working populations. However, one of the most 
original contributions to recent policy debate highlights by contrast the importance of foundation 
industries which exist anywhere significant populations are found (Bowman et al 2012; Bowman et 
al 2014; Foundational Economy Collective 2018). A principle function of the ‘foundational’ is in fact 
to connect the different spaces where people live, by agency of the public and private providers 
concerned with roads, tracks, pipes, wires, cables, conduits and grids. A concern with the mundane 
and prosaic, and the fabric of everyday life, elevates social services like food chains and food retail 
which are essential because they are needed everywhere. While recognition of the foundational 
economy approach as an incipient effort ‘to find new measures of local and regional development’ 
(Pike et al 2017: 54) has been relatively quick, extending the metaphor of place to these industries 
also requires thinking on a different spatial plane. But since this seems a straightforward enough 
extension in principle, ‘place’ recommends itself as a notation that is translatable across cultures, 
naturally inclusive, and can draw disparate threads together.  
 
The value of this can be readily illustrated for the case of France, when compared to Britain. Like 
Britain, prior to 2008 the French policy towards industry was officially horizontal, albeit with 
differences in context. The French national economy retained significantly more tranches of 
domestic industrial ownership, and its policy disposition was more tolerant than supportive of 
foreign owned firms. However, France did undertake mass privatisations from the 1990s onwards, in 
major areas like transport, energy, aerospace and communications, accompanied by  abandonment 
of earlier dirigiste enthusiasm for state-sponsored industrial reconstructions, and amounting to a 
‘doctrine of resolute disengagement of the State’ (Bertrand and Gauron 2015: 25). Like Britain, the 
2008 crisis has seen some efforts to rethink policy. A summit (a Conférence Nationale de l’industrie) 
was convened in 2009 to bring state, industrialists and trade unions together to consider and 
formulate responses. This led to the recommendation of a ‘coordinated approach’ to value-chains, 
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including scrutiny of national outsourcing, and the launch of grand projects, such as ‘vehicles of the 
future’ (the recent policy launch in Britain of four ‘grand challenges’ has all the hallmarks of a tribute 
to earlier French styling), followed by the formation of twelve strategic committees for different 
sections of industry (ibid: 38).  
 
However, recent events have brought another aspect of the whole question of French policy to the 
foreground. The Gilets Jaunes movement staged its first mass demonstrations in November 2018, 
sparked initially by a new diesel and petrol tax announced by the Macron government as part of a 
drive towards green energy, but morphing quickly into more general protests. The geography of the 
protests, distinguishing the metropolitan elites which dominate the cultural and economic centres of 
the larger French cities from the different France which exists in its ‘peripheral’ towns and rural 
areas [5], is a new topic not only for current affairs but for future academic research. The French 
President has responded to events with a mix of policy concessions and deferrals, together with a 
large scale exercise in managed public consultation, the Grande Debate. If this belated effort 
illustrates the importance for social scientists to look at the processes by which the populations 
affected by policies are included or excluded from their formation, the particular geographies so far 
revealed in the pattern of the French protests highlights the importance of place. 
 
By contrast with Britain and France, the German case is interesting because it is largely unmoved 
from the formal principles of horizontalism. It is perhaps worth recalling here that the philosophies 
of ordoliberalism and die soziale Marktwirtschaft, originating in pre-WW2 Germany with Walter 
Eucken and the Frieburg School, and the likes of Alexander Rüstow, remain the official doctrines of 
Christian Democrats. Consistent with this, Aiginger (2015: 370-372) credits Germany as having been 
the main force pushing the European Commission towards a horizontalist industrial policy doctrine 
in the first place.[6] Indeed, if there were concerns before 2008 in Germany it was that its 
manufacturing industries were viewed in some quarters as too big, and evidence of the relative 
underdevelopment of service, financial and ‘creative / cultural’ industries (Gerlach and Zieglar 2015: 
60).  
 
Even so, it still surprises that the first German national industrial strategy document published in 
2010, in response to the crisis of 2008, not only chose ‘framework’ areas as its positive focal point 
but warned against state industrial intervention: ‘leave the development, manufacture and 
marketing of future consumer and capital goods, as well as the development of new production 
technologies … to the “invisible hand” … the state should therefore stay out of market processes as 
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far as possible’ (BMWi 2010: 32; cited by Gerlach and Zieglar 2015: 72).  Subsequently, there has 
been more interest in industrial policy, flagging up the importance of cross-sectoral innovations in 
areas associated with the ‘industry 4.0’ project and electro-mobility, but still at an arms-length from 
the state, and cast around venture capital, resources, and trade (ibid: 73).  At the time of writing, 
and acting in tandem with France, Germany has just announced that it will seek revisions to EU 
competition rules to permit mergers which form industrial ‘European’ champions. 
 
Of the large economy cases, Italy is in many ways the most complex. Before 2008, labour market de-
regulation and privatisation did inform policy debate. Moreover, in the same way that German 
policy makers worried that manufacture was too big, policy elites, in an economy famed 
internationally for its industrial districts, worried that part of Italy’s difficulties stemmed from its 
smaller and medium sized firms (Simonazzi 2015: 146-151). Since 2008, critics of ‘restructuring’ since 
have focused on points like depressed domestic demand through low wage growth; threats to 
industrial districts from the off-shoring of jobs and globalisation of value-chains; and the widening 
North-South divide, where divergence is blamed both on the crisis and on the Euro (ibid). Taken as a 
whole, the difficulty in appraising Italy is guessing the directions in which it will next turn. 
Contending political alternatives to the pre-crisis polity now compete for public space, with a 
plethora of competing viewpoints in contest, ranging through laissez faire, neoliberalism, a return to 
‘corporatism’, and a desire to revitalise industrial districts and networks. 
 
What each case has in common is a shared policy context inside the EU, over long and relevant 
periods. None of these ‘national’ cases can be fully understood in isolation either from this fact or 
from each other, because of the degree of integration achieved up to this point – a point which 
extends similarly to Britain, notwithstanding the angsts of Brexit. In the French case, where 
accusations of a system of privileges are now in open debate, the progress from reactions to a fossil-
fuel tax by car dependent populations to a broader challenge to a dominant policy culture illustrates 
how inclusivity in policy formation can suddenly seem very relevant to questions of social stability 
and social equity. Indeed, in the Italian case, where government support in some quarters for the 
Gilets Jaunes movement in France is currently undermining diplomatic relations between the two 
countries in an unprecedented way, there is certainly the potential for developments that could 
destabilise the wider region. While in Germany an existing approach to policy remains broadly intact, 
the pressures there are also quite considerable, as further noted below. Not only is it clear that 
there is scope for place-engaged involvement by social scientists on the subject of practical 




Industrial policy for re-democratisation? 
The question posed in the introduction to this paper is whether industrial policy should be about 
more than material production, and whether developing participative rights and democratic 
practices in policy formulation should itself be an aim of policy. Clearly, democratisation has 
contested meanings that lie well beyond this paper’s scope to explore. However, if the word is used 
as a signifier of efforts to engage expanded cross-sections of the population(s) affected by industrial 
policy in policy design and delivery, then the issues raised in this paper are relevant to questions of 
democracy. Because the particular context for the sea changes in industrial policy chosen in this 
paper is the policies of the EU, and since the national cases used are drawn from its larger member-
states, it is useful in this closing section to step back for a broader view. 
 
Rodrik’s trilemma and democracy as practice 
Posing industrial policy in terms of what this implies for the practical scope of practiced democracy is 
not in itself an innovation. Consider Rodrik’s (2011) globalisation paradox. This argues that 
‘hyperglobalisation’, implicitly defined as a strong impetus towards international freedom of trade in 
goods and services and free capital flows, is not reconcilable with democracy when the nation state 
resides as its primary locus. National state institutions are assumed to be effective in reducing the 
transactions costs of doing business domestically but to create transactions costs for businesses on 
the international plane (due to differences in currencies, legal systems, regulatory standards, and so 
forth). National state institutions are thus ‘indispensable’ for nationally-defined markets, but ‘the 
main obstacle’ for global markets (ibid: 22). This poses a trilemma:  
 
(a) Hyperglobalisation plus a nation state which orients its institutions and policies towards the 
needs of international business, at the expense of democracy. 
 
(b) Hyperglobalisation plus democracy channelled into supra-national institutions that operate 
on the international plane, at the expense of the nation state. 
 
(c) Democracy plus the nation state at the expense of hyperglobalisation. 
 
The great value of this model is that it meets the assumptions of a project like the European single 
market on something like its own terms. Although not quite ‘hyperglobalisation’ as such, because of 
the bordered jurisdiction of the EU, much of the literature on the benefits of a single European 
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market and currency is transactions cost oriented. This is also a standard against which the economic 
efficacy of institutions is gauged in Rodrik’s model. The gradual transfer of sovereignty in economic 
matters from member states to the organs of the EU, together with efforts to construct a meaningful 
European Parliament, can be related to (b); and the weakness of this institution as a democratic 
body could in turn help illuminate some of the tensions which exist in Europe. 
 
 A point repeatedly made is that markets need institutions to support them – ‘markets are most 
developed and most effective in generating wealth when they are backed by solid government 
institutions’ (ibid: 16). This is similarly consistent with EC directives to member-states to establish 
favourable framework conditions for business. The level of abstraction in Rodrik’s analysis does 
mean that the principle democratic tension which the model highlights, for a case like European 
economic integration, is incompatibility between different unitary national preferences: ‘there are 
too many differences among nation states … for their needs and preferences to be accommodated 
within common rules and institutions’ (ibid: xix). Applied to the EU, problems follow because Britain, 
say, cannot agree with France, which disagrees with Germany, and so forth. Once disagreement is 
admitted within as well as between nation states, the political economy naturally looks more 
complicated: witness past divisions within Britain between trade union and other factions over 
European working time directives, or current fissures over ‘Brexit’. But read on the level intended, to 
the point being made, this is a valuable and original contribution. 
 
However, it is possible to develop a further layer of perspective on the democratic tensions arising in 
the context of the European single market project, by noting how a social market neoliberal model, 
homologous with a horizontalist perspective on industry, distances democracy. If Britain, for 
example, had never joined the EU, but had evolved nonetheless a policy system that was 
depoliticising in the sense of Gamble, and was grounded in the same avowedly horizontal approach 
to policies towards industry, then the ademocratic policy culture thus incubated could still be 
expected to induce democratic stresses inside the ‘independent’ nation. This would be true even 
without the added factor of suspicions about continued subterranean relationships between states 
and favoured industries in a formal context officially denying such relationships. The quality of the 
democracy would still be an enfeebled one liable to generate tensions, especially once economic 
issues other than transactions costs in markets, as well as different societal interests, are recognised. 
Put a little differently, the ‘democratic’ content of option (c) must still depend on the policy model. 
Conversely, a question to be asked is whether ‘Europe’, with a different kind of policy stance, could 




While this looks more difficult as a live prospect today than it did thirty years ago, it is not for this 
reason a question to be avoided in the context of the new interest in industrial policy. Concerns 
about democratic deficits, and appropriate models for a democratic and participative industrial 
policy, were in fact one of the founding preoccupations of the European Network on Industrial Policy 
(EUNIP), which was very much active in the 1990s. Much encouraged by the thesis of Piore and Sabel 
(1984) that policy interventions at appropriate historical junctures can critically shape the 
developmental trajectories of capitalism, an early preoccupation was with policies for local and 
regional clusters and networks, envisaged as vehicles for democratisation as well as material 
development. It was assumed that the model for ‘Europe’ that could work would be a ‘Europe of the 
regions’, to protect diversity and give free scope to participative industrial policy models. Cowling 
and Sugden (1994), Sugden et al (1994) and Devine et al (1996) give a flavour of some of this debate. 
Industrial policy was therefore broached as a vehicle for democracy, devolution and co-operation, as 
well as production. Redolent  of De Tocqueville (2003 [1835]), who contrasted democracy with 
hierarchical dependencies and saw it as a practical thing requiring daily practice, another element 
was to parse the potentials of technological and organisational change for delivering democratic 
practices on the ground. 
 
In considering all of this from the viewpoint of the present situation, the conjunctures noted in the 
introduction to this paper, and as identified in Martin et al (2018), are difficult. It is increasingly clear 
that hourly labour productivity growth, the main determinant of rates of growth of per capita 
incomes (on which for Britain and France see ibid: 8), has been in secular decline across Western 
Europe. Figure 4 shows OECD data for Britain, France, Germany and Italy, over a more than forty 
year period, which uses a filtering technique to separate trend-lines from short term cyclical 
fluctuations. The secular decline has occurred in all four cases despite different rates of 
deindustrialisation. Germany, followed by Italy, still has a substantially larger manufacturing base 
than either Britain or France, whose manufacturing-share declines have more or less paralleled each 
other. The values of the national Gini coefficient are superimposed. Inequality in Britain, measured 
on this index, is comparably high with Italy, but like Germany also markedly greater in the later part 
of the period. To add to a socially volatile mix, figure 5 shows national CO2 emissions for the same 
four countries, as well as emissions worldwide. Because of the particular types of its industries, as 
well as their absolute size, Germany faces the most considerable pressures here, but the threat of 




insert figures 4 and 5 around here 
 
Returning to the tensions identified by Rodrik’s trilemma, it is an understatement to say that there is 
evidence of these tensions in the political uncertainties now contorting Europe. The management of 
the Eurozone, now the single most emblematic feature of the quest to eliminate transactions costs 
in the context of European economic integration and the single market project, retains its potential 
as a source of major political fissures within France, Germany and Italy, hitherto the bedrock 
countries of the EU. The non-Euro member state of Britain may (perhaps) soon leave the EU. In 
Britain and Germany policy elites remain seemingly enamoured of de-regulated product and labour 
markets; in France a similar disposition amongst policy elites may now be undergoing a partial 
revision, albeit one driven by street protests rather than intellectual conversions. In Britain and 
France there have been parallel shifts in opinion towards openly interventionist industrial policy 
stances, while in Germany adherence to a formal horizontalism in industrial policy continues. By 
contrast with all three, in Italy, whose situation is highly fluid, a plethora of alternative if frequently 
inconsistent policy agendas are competing for space. What all share in common is a growing sense of 
social fragmentation around what is or is not a desirable way forward for the populations in each. 
 
Conclusion 
There have been visible shifts as well as stresses in the conduct of industrial policy across the 
European Union, in terms of what is condoned by the European Commission, and in what is 
observed in countries like Britain as well as (currently) more committed EU-member states like 
France, Germany and Italy, albeit to varying degrees and from different vantage points. At the same 
time, since now ‘back on the agenda’, the upsurge in interest on the part of governments and other 
bodies is calling forth a similar re-awakening of interest in industrial policy amongst academics in the 
social sciences. The agendas being set down by the former naturally incline towards production and 
trade metrics. But there are other issues too that social scientists, both by professional inclination 
and professional training, have an opportunity to explore in the context of how and why industrial 
policies are created as policies. A theme which was historically prominent in industrial policy debate 
– i.e. how to evolve more democratic practices for industrial policy decision making and 
implementation, to include those parts of the populations affected by the policy – is at risk of being 
submerged in the urgency of the preoccupation with industrial growth. But this is at least as urgent a 
topic today as it was before the first shock of the crisis in 2008. The recommendation in this paper, 
looking at the progression through strict horizontalism in policy, to selective sector-targeting, to 
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place-based formulations, is that the last is an appropriate starting point for rethinking ‘what is 
industrial policy for?’ and why democratising approaches may be pertinent. 
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[1] Krugman (1994) famously criticised European ideas about ‘competitiveness’ as a ‘dangerous 
obsession’ that would undermine confidence in trade, but in reality what was principally entailed 
were efforts by the European Commission to create a level playing field for competition inside the 
single market. 
 
[2] Coffey and Thornley (2015) summarise these earlier developments, as part of an integrated 
survey of the evolution of British industrial policy since in relation to trade unions. They also 
emphasise the peculiar role which antipathy towards unions played in policy development.  
 
[3] Reflecting a particularly strong national preoccupation in Britain with winning international 
business investment in the corporate sector, the SME sector was practically subsumed as an adjunct 
to the main part of policy, despite measures like upgraded advisory centres and a new ministerial 
post. For an example of empirically-led criticism of this subordinating approach, see Kitson et al 
(2003). 
 
[4] Aluminium, steel, cement, ceramics, glass, paper making, and oil and chemicals were initially 
identified as key energy intensive industries, more recently joined by high carbon elements in the 
food chain. 
 
[5] Guilluy and Debevoise (2019), translating into English a formulation arrived at some time before 
the Gilets Jaunes movement manifested, is currently dominating French discussion. 
 
[6] Bertrand and Gauron (2015: 22) also cite British lobbying against state involvement with industry 
as an important factor that helped undermine older interventionist traditions within the EU. 
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Figure 2: homologous entities for an ademocratic policy culture 
 
 






















































            Figure 3: a British rank ordering of sectors by spillover potential 
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Figure 4: labour productivity growth trends and income inequalities 
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Data Source: European Commission Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 2016 
 
 
 
